Ayn Rand and the Virtue of Self-Delusion
In The Virtue of Selfishness Ayn Rand sets out the basis for her Objectivist ethics. “An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, and that which threatens it is the evil.”1 The problem with this definition, of course, is that it runs headlong into the is/ought fallacy: we can’t go from descriptions of the world to making prescriptions about how things should be done. Simply describing facts about the world does not give us moral guidlines for our behavior.
Rand, however, is aware of this problem, and provides a response to it:
In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between “is” and “ought.” 2
Rand’s strategy here is perhaps one of the most brazen examples of intellectual legerdemain that you we find in a (pseudo-)philosophical work. She acknowledges the counterargument to her position, and responds to it by simply restating her position with greater emphasis—“let me stress that …”. There is modification to her argument, nor any attempt to deal with the objection. Her reference to ‘values’ is 
itself an example of the is/ought fallacy, and can therefore not constitute a argument against it. Rand’s response to the is/ought fallacy is, in effect, to do nothing more than gainsay it. No critique, no counterargument, merely a bald rejection without any support.
To make matters worse, there’s also a fallacy of equivocation lurking in this non-argument. Rand uses the term ‘value’ in two quite different ways, but treats them as equivalent: the act of valuing something is not the same as holding a (moral) value. For example, I may value my favorite shirt, but that is in no way a moral value. In the same way, Rand’s emphasis that we value our lives has no relation to the types of moral values we hold in our lives.
Unfortunately, the above passage from The Virtue of Selfishness is a good indication of the general quality of Rand’s philosophy – absolute rubbish.
CITATIONS:
1. Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, New York: Signet, 1964, (pp.13-39) p. 17.
2. Rand, p.18.
Comments
7 Comments so far
Your blog is interesting, and I hope to hear more from you.
I’m no fan of Rand’s philosophy, and I disagree with her argument here, but I don’t think it’s absolute rubbish. You seem to be assuming exactly the point she’s arguing against: that facts cannot imply values. Such a strict fact-value dichotomy (G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy) seems to me untenable overall. Alasdair MacIntyre does a better job overall of knocking it down than Rand does; but there’s something important in what Rand is trying to do here as well. What she is doing is denying the idea of the naturalistic fallacy by showing a specific example – the example she considers most important – of a case in which “is” does indeed imply “ought.” I think she does that by effectively denying the second distinction you assert: between moral value and other kinds of value. For Rand, the value you place on your shirt may indeed be a moral value. The fact that, to exist, beings must value their lives is one way in which facts do lead to values. (Where Rand’s argument fails is because the valuing of life is not as necessary or universal as she claims: many beings do in fact not value their lives. She has no way to argue against a suicide.)
I notice that, while you blame Rand for relying on assertion over argument, it doesn’t seem to me that you’ve argued for the (to my mind completely untenable) idea of the naturalistic fallacy either; you simply assert it.
^ Even if the value in life is moral, how is a fact of people valuing their lives (assuming it happens all the time – which as you pointed out, it doesn’t), means they *ought* to do that? Makes no sense to me at all. If the argument implies a necessity to comply to “human nature”, then I also fail to see reasons to justify such necessity. I see no rational reason at all why humans should further their own lives.
While I would really like to see a woman do well in any field,including philosophy,I have never come to like Rand’s ideas.After reading and viewing her interviews,her propostions and presentations came across to me as developing a philosophy for the sake of it,for the sake of accomplishing the title of modern philosopher,rather than developing an idea that is practical,humane and provable.
..also,I am not surprised that she chose not to have children.The idea of selfish pursuit of one’s own happiness and a condescending attitude towards mediocrity cannot come easily to a person who has become a parent.Because,that is when you realise,however accomplished,smart or strong a parent is,there is nothing in the world that can ensure that the child will not have his/her failures.Also,it is heart-breaking as a parent to see one’s child being at the receiving end of any kind of “self-oriented pursuit of happiness”.
There’s an interesting blog on Rand at http://aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com that you might want to take a look into. It is run by two guys (Greg Nyquist and Daniel Barnes) who have taken up a very strong and critical critique of her work, but I think it often starts up very interesting philosophical discussions commentary wise.
Greg, in fact, wrote a book on which the blog gets its name. They’re both very well read in terms of philosophyand rip into Rand’s sometimes outright irrationality pretty fairly. This entry is a particularly favorite bit of mine:
http://aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/2007/04/rands-anti-heroic-ethics.html
It never ceases to amaze me how people can struggle with the is-ought argument. What clouds of ambivalence people must live in. How can you not pass through life and render value judgements in response to facts as perceived. i.e. Try crossing a road and not render a judgement about safety. Try having a date and not forming an opinion about the counter party.
Unless I’m missing something, Andrew, both of your examples relate to ‘is’ judgements. A judgement regarding whether or not crossing the road is ’safe’ at a particular time is descriptive, not prescriptive. The same applies to forming opinions of a person’s character. Further, your argument in itself seems to be an instance of the fallacy. It may be that we inevitably do make such judgements, but it doesn’t follow that we *should*.