Kant: Misogyny vs. Racism
The following excerpt from ‘Of National Characteristics’ finds Kant in something of a quandary. He recognises merit in the sexist bigotry of a “Negro carpenter,” but can’t bring himself to overlook the fact that the fellow “was quite black from head to foot”:
In the lands of the black, what better can one expect than what is found prevailing, namely the feminine sex in the deepest slavery? A despairing man is always a strict master over anyone weaker, just as with us that man is always a tyrant in the kitchen who outside his own house hardly dares to look anyone in the face. Of course, Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment toward his wives, answered: “You whites are indeed fools, for first you make great concessions to your wives, and afterward you complain when they drive you mad.” And it might be that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.1
In this particularly ugly passage, we bear witness to Kant’s misogyny running afoul of his racism. He wants to entertain the claim that European men are too lenient with their wives, but he won’t let himself consider it as it was uttered by a black man. Racism, it seems, trumps misogynism. It’s hardly the Enlightenment’s greatest moment.
One point to note about this passage is that Kant’s racism goes a step beyond that of Hume’s. By noting that the man’s skin colour was “clear proof that what he said was stupid”, Kant—like Hegel—makes the inferiority of blacks an intrinsic quality (though for different reasons*). Blacks are, effectively, a priori stupid.
Note (1): This is an early comment from Kant (1764), and apparently he later retracted his racist views. If anyone has a source for this retraction, I’d appreciate it.
Note (2): Bracketed comment marked by * added Feb. 2, 2008)
CITATIONS:
1. Immanuel Kant, ‘Of National Characteristics, so far as They Depend upon the Distinct Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’ in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, p.113.
Comments
4 Comments so far
That Kant’s comment is pretty ugly indeed.
It seems to me that you have prejudices of your own towards Hegel though (sorry for that, couldn’t help it). At least I couldn’t see in your linked post any signs that Hegel is arguing for ‘inferiority of blacks as an intrinsic quality’.
Part of the quote from that post: “This distinction between himself as an individual and the universality of his essential being, the African in the uniform, undeveloped oneness of his existence has not yet attained”. If Hegel thinks that people in Africa has *not yet* attained some level of consciousness, clearly he can’t think that it is intristic quality that they are inferior, “not yet” openly says that they may in fact attain this level – it is open possibility. So that it is contingent state of affairs which is not related to the color of their skin, or place of birth, but just to the state in which the culture of those particular people were at that moment of time.
From the quoted parts, I imagine Hegel wouldn’t make distinction of people on base of their skin if they are part of the same culture.
Anyway, I might be wrong, but again, those quoted parts, just doesn’t seem enough for what you are claiming.
Hi Tanasije, thanks for pointing that out. You may well have a point, and it might be an idea to rephrase it a little. But I’m not sure. Wouldn’t whatever level of metaphysical development an individual (or in this case, population) has achieved be an intrinsic feature? Intrinsic features of a thing are those which it has in and of itself (as opposed to extrinsic features which it has only in its relation to something else.) Certainly, the fact that one has the capacity to develop to a higher level is an intrinsic feature, but wouldn’t the level one is at now also be an intrinsic feature? (I’m assuming intrinsic features need not be immutable, therefore a property’s contingency poses no problem.) And Hegel is pretty clear on what level he feels Africans have attained.
Anyway, the point I’m trying to make in the post above is that the comments of Kant and Hegel are considerably stronger than that of Hume (and it’s relevant to compare the comments of roughly contemporary figures on the same issue). Kant thinks the mere fact of possessing dark skin proves one is inferior; and Hegel sees Africans as being in some way fundamentally inferior to Europeans; whereas Hume’s comment is made in passing (it’s in a footnote) and is more speculative (“I’m apt to suspect …”).
As for the claim that Hegel wouldn’t make the distinction between two people of different skin colour within the same culture, it strikes me as a little too charitable, but rather difficult to prove either way. But, I’ll grant he appears preoccupied with things other than skin colour.
My first reaction was: That’s a misrepresentation of Kant. My second reaction was: Who care’s? I don’t idolize Kant, and even if he were a racist, it doesn’t detract from my opinion that he is the most important philosopher that ever existed.
I’m half a year late to the party, here, but I’m going to reply anyway:
With regard to your first point, Mike, the passage is a direct quotation. Granted, I haven’t read the source material myself, but I find it hard to imagine how context could mitigate the offensive stupidity of a comment which quite literally asserts that everything black people say is stupid. On your second point, I essentially agree, and I suspect the author of this site would also. In fact, the entire premise of this site is essentially a recognition of the fact that people who have contributed some of the most significant ideas in philosophy have also said some mind-numbingly stupid things. The corollary of that, of course, is that the fact that a person has said some mind-numbingly stupid things does not necessarily detract from the quality of their other ideas. Both of those are important things to understand: rejecting ideas purely on the basis of their origin is an instance of the genetic fallacy, while simply accepting ideas on the same basis is an instance of ad verecundiam.